# Material Welfare and Preferences for Redistribution

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### Overview

- Research question: To what extent are political preferences determined by material welfare?
- Goal of this paper: Tackle this old question with new data (GSS Panel) and methodology (individual fixed-effects models)
- Result: Cleaner test of the effect of changes in income and employment on support for redistribution

# Theory (briefly)

- Self-interest perspective (volatility)
- Values perspective (stability)
- Jury is still out

# Methodological considerations

- Endogeneity of material circumstances
  - Difficult to randomly assign unemployment and income loss (we don't have this kind of lottery)
- Lack of panel data
- Differing units of analysis

# Analytic strategy

- Exploit panel data to track changes in individuals' employment status and household income alongside changes in preferences for redistribution
- Try to isolate unique effect of changes in material welfare by using individual fixedeffects models to control for time –invariant observed and unobserved characteristics

# Why now?

- Release of GSS and timing with the Great Recession.
- There is a sizable group of people who lose jobs and/or household income.
  - 7.8% of respondents lose their jobs
  - 18.2% of people lose 20% or more of household income between o6 and o8, 26.2% between o8 and 10


### Data

- General Social Survey Panel
  - 2006, 2008, 2010 panel
  - 2008, 2010 panel (2012 wasn't available when we went to publication)
  - DV: "eqwlth" (conventional in the literature)
  - IVs: household income, employment status

# **Findings**


#### Figure 1. Changes in Preferences for Redistribution






FT Employed to Unemployed FT Employed to FT Employed

#### 1c. Mean Change, by Income Loss




■ Income Loss of 20% or More
■ No Income Loss

#### 1b. Percent Increasing Preferences, by Employment Transition



#### 1d. Percent Increasing Preferences, by Income Loss



# **Findings**

Table 2. Fixed Effects Models of the Relationship Between Unemployment, Income Loss, and Preferences for Redistribution

	Preferences for Redistribution											
	N	Iodel 1		$\mathbf{N}$	Iodel 2		Model 3					
	Clustered				Clustered			Clustered				
	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.			
<b>Employment Status</b>												
Unemployed	0.514	0.196	**				0.626	0.279	*			
Full-Time (Omitted)												
20% Loss in HH Income				0.503	0.108	***	0.432	0.177	*			
Year												
2008	0.078	0.086		-0.156	0.068	*	-0.023	0.095				
2010	-0.456	0.097	***	-0.572	0.085	***	-0.520	0.125	***			
2006 (Omitted)												
n (clusters)	1,6	531		2,1	20		1,2					
n (observations)	2,9	17		3,5	506		1,895					

Significance Levels: \*<0.05; \*\*<0.01; \*\*\*<0.001

Notes: Listwise deletion is used to deal with missing data. Models 1 and 3 are limited to respondents who were unemployed or employed full-time. Standard errors are clustered by respondent.

### Robustness checks (overview)

- Differential attrition
- Multiple outcome measures
- Multiple income cutoffs
- Wholesale shift in attitudes
- Placebo tests

### Differential attrition

- Similar patterns to Smith and Son (2009)
  - Married and most educated least likely
- Similar results in weighted analysis (which limits results to those who remain in the sample)

### Multiple outcome measures

- Do our results rely on our particular measure of redistribution?
- Results with two other related variables are similar ("natfare" and "helppoor")

## Multiple income cutoffs

- Are our results sensitive to our measure of income loss (20%)?
- Similar results with an absolute measure of a loss of \$10,000 and with 10%, 15%, and 25% losses

### Wholesale shift in attitudes

- Perhaps the unemployed are just fed up with capitalism?
- What if they are shifting attitudes toward government services more generally?
- No change in attitudes toward social security, mass transit, or parks and recreation
- Effect is delimited

### Placebo tests

- Spurious findings?
- Shouldn't see a change in attitudes unrelated to material welfare (no medicine)
- No change in attitudes toward gun control, gay rights, or abortion

### Conclusions

- Loss of job or income results in an increase in support for redistributive social policies
- This occurs despite aggregate public opinion shifting in the opposite direction
- Clean test of effect of pocketbook on political attitudes
- Future directions (contextual effects using geocoded data)

## Thank you

- Comments and questions to lowens@stanford.edu
- Check out the article in Social Forces (advance access online)

**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for General Social Survey Panels** 

	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
At First Interview				
Redistribution (1 = No Redistribution)	4.392	1.984	1	7
Employment Status	<del>-</del>			-
Full-Time Employed	0.498	0.500	0	1
Unemployed	0.035	0.183	0	1
Part-Time Employed	0.100	0.300	0	1
Temporarily Not Working	0.022	0.148	0	1
Student	0.032	0.176	0	1
Home	0.171	0.376	0	1
Retired	0.112	0.315	0	1
"Other" Work Arrangement	0.029	0.169	0	1
Household Income (Median)	\$45,000	\$58,153	\$500	\$243,308
Male	0.440	0.500	0	1
Race	-	-		
White, Non-Hispanic	0.703	0.457	0	1
Black, Non-Hispanic	0.137	0.344	0	1
Other Race	0.160	0.366	0	1
Age	47.400	17.300	18	89
Education (Years)	13.500	3.100	0	20
Married	0.480	0.500	0	1
Changes from 2006 to 2008				
Full-Time Employment to Unemployment	0.038	0.191	0	1
Income Loss of 20% or More	0.182	0.353	0	1
Preferences for Redistribution	-0.002	1.940	-6	6
Changes from 2008 to 2010				
Full-Time Employment to Unemployment	0.069	0.254	0	1
Income Loss of 20% or More	0.262	0.414	0	1
Preferences for Redistribution	-0.443	1.970	-6	6

Notes: Under the "At First Interview" heading, we present descriptive statistics for the first time respondents were interviewed for both the 2006 and 2008 panel cohorts. Under the "Changes from 2006 to 2008" and "Changes from 2008 to 2010" headings, we present descriptive statistics about how respondents change on our key variables of interest between waves. Missing values are excluded from the descriptive statistics.

ole 3. Fixed Effects Models of the Relationship Between Unemployment, Income Loss, and Attitudes Toward Government ending

**Spending on Social Security** 

**Spending on Mass Transit** 

Spending on Parks & Recreation

	_		_		-			_	_				_	_			
	Model 4 Clustered			Model 5 Clustered			Model 6 Clustered			Model 7 Clustered			Model 8 Clustered			Model 9 Clustered	
	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.												
ployment Status																	
Unemployed	0.049	0.051					-0.037	0.060					-0.056	0.044			
Full-Time (Omitted)																	
6 Loss in HH Income				0.014	0.029					-0.022	0.034					-0.036	0.030
r																	
2008	0.010	0.023		-0.015	0.020		0.054	0.027	*	0.052	0.022	*	-0.040	0.022		-0.034	0.090
2010	-0.079	0.024	***	-0.100	0.022	***	* -0.027	0.028		-0.017	0.025		-0.025	0.024		-0.032	0.022
2006 (Omitted)																	

lusters) 2,404 3,111 2,389 3,060 2,427 3,147 4,247 5,110 4,206 5,000 4,351 5,198

bservations) ificance Levels: \*<0.05; \*\*<0.01; \*\*\*<0.001

es: Listwise deletion is used to deal with missing data. Models 4, 6, and 8 are limited to respondents who were unemployed or employed full-time. All models are linear fixed-effective.

els and include standard errors clustered by respondent.

able 4. Placebo Tests of the Relationship Between Unemployment, Income Loss, and Attitudes on Social Issues

		Abortion						Gay Marriage				Gun Laws						
	M	Model 10		M	Model 11		N	Model 12 Clustered			Model 13 Clustered		Model 14			Model 15		
	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.		S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Si
mployment Status																		
Unemployed	0.213	0.385					0.020	0.127					-0.419	0.423				
Full-Time (Omitted)																		
% Loss in HH Income				-0.122	0.256					0.095	0.071					-0.021	0.257	
ear																		
2008	0.083	0.213		0.113	0.179		0.065	0.048		0.030	0.043		-0.149	0.212	,	-0.028	0.181	Ĺ
2010	-0.058	0.222	,	0.170	0.196		0.175	0.053	**	0.127	0.049	*	-0.453	0.220	*	-0.432	0.196	, *
2006 (Omitted)																		
(clusters)	20	)1		20	03		1,	,627		2,	,163		21	13		20	07	
(observations)	48	37		54	43		2.	,945		3,	,576		51	15		5.	55	

otes: Listwise deletion is used to deal with missing data. Models 10, 12, and 14 are limited to respondents who were unemployed or employed full-time. The models for abortion a n laws are fixed-effects logit models because those dependent variables are binary. The gay marriage models are linear fixed-effects models and include standard errors clustered by spondent.

Table A1. Fixed Effects Models of the Relationship Between Unemployment, Income Loss, and Alternative Measures of Support for Redistribution

	Govern	ıment Sp	endin	g on Assis	<b>Government Role in Helping Poor</b>							
	M	lodel A1		Model A2			M	Iodel A3		Model A4		
		Clustered			Clustered			Clustered		Clustered		
	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.
<b>Employment Status</b>												
Unemployed	0.099	0.053	+				0.213	0.129	+			
Full-Time (Omitted)												
20% Loss in HH Income				0.075	0.033	*				0.126	0.068	+
Year												
2008	-0.028	0.025		-0.013	0.020		-0.043	0.054		-0.032	0.044	
2010	-0.127	0.027	***	-0.137	0.025	***	-0.219	0.059	***	-0.177	0.054	***
2006 (Omitted)												
n (clusters)	2,4	20		3,138			1,6	527		2,108		
n (observations)	4,3	29		5,1	72		2,8	384		3,467		

Significance Levels: +<0.10; \*<0.05; \*\*<0.01; \*\*\*<0.001

Notes: Listwise deletion is used to deal with missing data. Models A1 and A3 are limited to respondents who were unemployed or employed full-time. Standard errors are clustered by respondent.

Table B1. Ordered Logit Fixed Effects Models of the Relationship Between Unemployment, Income Loss, and Preferences for Redistribution

	Preferences for Redistribution											
	M	lodel B1	N									
	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.						
<b>Employment Status</b>												
Unemployed	0.647	0.290	*									
Full-Time (Omitted)												
20% Loss in HH Income				0.680	0.160	***						
Year												
2008	-0.310	0.093	**	-0.221	0.101	*						
2010	-0.939	0.151	***	-0.814	0.125	***						
2006 (Omitted)												

Significance Levels: \*<0.05; \*\*<0.01; \*\*\*<0.001

Notes: Listwise deletion is used to deal with missing data. Model B1 is limited to respondents who were unemployed or employed full-time.

**Table B1. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Who Changes on Their Preferences for Redistribution** 

		_	erence	s for Redis					
		6 to 2008		2008 to 2010					
		Iodel 6		Model 7					
	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig			
<b>Employment Status</b>									
Unemployed	0.714	0.446		0.086	0.080				
Part-Time Employed	0.006	0.224		-0.005	0.048				
Temporarily Not Working	-0.411	0.524		-0.174	0.105				
Student				-0.065	0.132				
Work at Home	0.089	0.483		-0.107	0.093				
Retired	0.142	0.631		-0.075	0.099				
Other Work Situation	-0.281	0.907		-0.291	0.167				
Full-Time (Omitted)									
Household Income (log)	-0.019	0.105		-0.007	0.022				
Political Views	-0.065	0.059		0.002	0.013				
Male	-0.266	0.166		-0.049	0.037				
Race									
Black	-0.490	0.237	*	0.046	0.054				
Other Race	0.126	0.294		0.207	0.072	**			
White (Omitted)									
Age	-0.076	0.042		0.007	0.009				
Age-Squared	0.001	0.000		0.000	0.000				
Education	-0.016	0.030		-0.010	0.007				
Married	-0.404	0.183	*	-0.035	0.041				
Region Included	ye	es		ye	es				
n	77	70		68	35				
Pseudo R-squared	0.03	321		0.03	329				

Notes: Log-odds presented. Listwise deletion is used to deal with missing data. Sample limited to respondents who were working full-time, working part-time, temporarily not working, or unemployed/laid off in 2006.

Table R1. Fixed Effects Models of Employment, Income Loss, and Preferences for Redistribution -- Using GSS Weights

	Preferences for Redistribution											
	]	Model R1	N	Iodel R2								
		Clustered			Clustered	Т						
	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.						
<b>Employment Status</b>												
Unemployed	0.802	0.278	**									
Full-Time (Omitted)												
20% Loss in HH Income				0.416	0.152	**						
Year												
2008	0.071	0.119		-0.114	0.089							
2010	-0.506	0.125	***	-0.539	0.099	***						
2006 (Omitted)												
n (clusters)	1,	189		1,0	659							
n (observations)	2,		2,9									

Notes: Weights included in both models. Listwise deletion is used to deal with missing data. Model R1 is limited to respondents who were unemployed or employed full-time. Standard errors are clustered by respondent.